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similar to Yamaguchi’s (1989).
M
SON TARGETING FERTILITY BEHAVIOR: SOME 
CONSEQUENCES AND DETERMINANTS*
DEEPANKAR BASU AND ROBERT DE JONG 
This article draws out some implications of son targeting fertility behavior and studies its 
 determinants. We demonstrate that such behavior has two notable implications at the aggregate level: 
(a) girls have a larger number of siblings (sibling effect), and (b) girls are born at relatively earlier par-
ities within families (birth-order effect). Empirically testing for these effects, we ¿ nd that both are pres-
ent in many countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and North Africa but are absent in the countries 
of sub-Saharan Africa. Using maximum likelihood estimation, we study the effect of covariates on son 
targeting fertility behavior in India, a country that displays signi¿ cant sibling and birth-order effects. 
We ¿ nd that income and geographic location of families signi¿ cantly affect son targeting behavior. 
any developing countries in East, South, and Southeast Asia, and North Africa are 
characterized by a strong son preference—that is, a strong preference for male as opposed 
to female offspring (Arnold, Choe, and Roy 1998; Clark 2000; Jensen 2002). This strong 
preference is reÀ ected in son targeting fertility behavior, also referred to in the literature 
as differential stopping behavior (DSB) or male-preferring stopping rules (see, e.g., Clark 
2000). The main idea behind such stopping rules is that the sex composition of current 
children determines the subsequent fertility behavior of families; for evidence on DSB see 
Arnold et al. (1998) and Larsen, Chung, and Das Gupta (1998). In our analysis, we concret-
ize DSB as follows: couples continue childbearing until they reach their desired number, 
k, of sons or when they hit the ceiling for the maximum number, N, of children that they 
determine to be feasible (given their resource constraints). The theoretical results in the ar-
ticle are derived on the basis of the assumption that every couple in the population follows 
this behavior; in the empirical model, we relax this assumption by allowing each couple to 
follow this behavior with some probability lying between 0 and 1. 
In this article, we highlight two important implications of son targeting fertility be-
havior. First, we demonstrate that if a population practices son targeting fertility behavior, 
girls will be born into relatively larger families; we call this the “sibling effect.” Second, 
we show that such behavior will also imply that girls are born relatively earlier within 
families; we call this the “birth-order effect.” Both effects might have important implica-
tions for gender inequality even in the absence of intrahousehold allocation biases, an issue 
we wish to study in the future. 
Fertility stopping rules have been previously studied in the demography literature. For 
instance, Yamaguchi (1989)1 de¿ ned  the following stopping rule: couples continue child-
bearing until they reach their desired number, k, of sons. Thus, in contrast to the stopping 
rule we use, Yamaguchi’s rule set no limit on the maximum number of children that couples 
could have in their attempt to attain the target number of boys. Our framework is more 
general; Yamaguchi’s model can be considered a special case of our model if we let N go to 
in¿ nity. The analysis becomes substantially simpli¿ ed when N can increase without bounds 
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1. Similar ideas can also be found in Ray (1998), whose proposed male preferring stopping rule is very
 because the number of children in a family follows a standard probability distribution (the 
negative binomial distribution); when N is a ¿ nite integer, there is no longer any standard 
distribution. Additionally, our framework is more realistic. It seems unreasonable to assume 
that couples have no limit on the number of children they can produce. In the sample for 
India (DHS 1992), for instance, about 94% of the households have ¿ ve or fewer children. 
Jensen (2002) arrived at results similar to what we have called the sibling effect, 
though he used a different stopping rule. In his model, couples want n children and b boys; 
but if they reach n children with fewer than b boys, they continue childbearing until they 
attain b boys or reach some maximum number of children, n + k. This stopping rule is a 
variant of that used by Seidl (1995); Jenson’s model is also a special case of our model with 
the desired number of sons k = b and the maximum number of children N = n + k. However, 
there are two major differences between our work and Jensen’s (2002). First, whereas we 
discuss both the sibling effect and the birth-order effect, Jensen (2002) limited himself only 
to the former. Second, unlike Jensen (2002), we use household-level data on birth sequenc-
es and desired family size to estimate the full model with maximum likelihood estimation. 
To focus attention on the issue of birth order, we differentiate between mean absolute 
and mean relative birth order. We compute the mean absolute birth order of girls (boys) by 
averaging the position of the female (male) child within the sequence of births in her (his) 
family, where averaging is done over all children in the population. To compute mean rela-
tive birth order of girls (boys) in the population, we ¿ rst calculate the average position of 
female (male) children within each family and then average over families. 
An example might clarify the difference. Consider the following scenario from Jensen 
(2002): couples want one child but will have a second one if the ¿ rst is not a boy. In this 
case, half the families will end up with a boy, one-fourth will have a girl and a boy (in that 
order), and another fourth will have two girls. Now, if we compute the mean absolute birth 
order of boys and girls, we see that it is the same for both at 4/3: two-thirds of both boys 
and girls are ¿ rstborn children, and one-third are second-born, and so the mean absolute 
birth order is 4/3 (= 1 × 2/3 + 2 × 1/3) for both boys and girls. 
Let us now compute the mean relative birth orders. To proceed, we de¿ ne an average 
within-family birth order (AWFBO) score for boys and girls respectively in each family 
and then average across families. Notice that boys have an AWFBO score of 1 in families 
that have only one child (half of the families) and an AWFBO score of 2 in families that 
have a girl as the ¿ rst child and a boy as the second child (one-fourth of the families). 
Girls, on the other hand, have an AWFBO score of 1 for families that have a girl as the 
¿ rst child and a boy as the second child (one-fourth of the families) and an AWFBO score 
of 3/2 (= (1 + 2) / 2) for families with two girls. Hence, the mean relative birth order for 
boys is 4/3 (= 1 × 2/3 + 2 × 1/3) because we average across families. Similarly, the mean 
relative birth order for girls is 5/4 (= 1 × 1/2 + 3/2 × 1/2). Thus, boys have a higher relative 
birth order than girls. 
Yamaguchi’s (1989) discussion of birth order refers to relative birth order. He con-
cluded his analysis by stating that “male-preferring stopping rules do not have a differential 
effect on the mean birth order of boys and girls” (Yamaguchi 1989:459). This result, which 
is at odds with ours, is really an artifact of the assumption that N can increase without 
bounds in his model. If we limit N to a ¿ nite integer, as we do in our model, the result no 
longer holds; the mean relative birth order for boys turns out to be greater than that for 
girls, as the above example shows and as we demonstrate later (see Observation 2). On the 
other hand, Jensen’s (2002:6) conclusion that “fertility-related characteristics such as birth 
order...do not differ between boys and girls…” is a statement about mean absolute birth 
order. Thus, even though both Yamaguchi (1989) and Jensen (2002) seem to have arrived 
at the same result, they were really referring to different measures of birth order. 
To summarize, the contribution of this article is twofold. First, the male-preferring 
stopping rule that we analyze is both more general and more realistic than that used by 
Yamaguchi (1989). Second, we highlight not only the sibling effect but also the birth order 
effect,2 an issue that seems to have been neglected so far in the literature (e.g., Jensen 2002). 
Our empirical results show that both sibling and birth-order effects are present in a host 
of countries in East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and North Africa. These effects are 
absent in countries of sub-Saharan Africa. When we compute the same effects for the Indian 
states, we ¿ nd their strong presence in the states of North, West, and Central India; the ef-
fects are absent in Kerala and in several states in Northeastern India. This is more or less in 
line with anecdotal evidence on patriarchal tendencies in the different geographic regions 
of India. Our maximum likelihood estimation for India reveals that geographic location of 
the family (urban versus rural) has a large and signi¿ cant impact on both desired fertility 
and son targeting: family size and the probability of son targeting behavior is higher in 
rural areas after we control for age, formal education, and other observable characteristics. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section presents the main re-
sults; the following section tests the empirical implications of the model with data from a 
wide range of countries in Asia and Africa; and the next section concludes the discussion 
with some conjectures on possible extensions of the current analysis. Proofs of the main 
theoretical claims, Observations 1 and 2 below, are available upon request from the authors; 
the appendix provides details about computations that are relevant for calculating the log-
likelihood function. 
MAIN RESULTS 
Many developing economies in South, East, and Southeast Asia, and North Africa display 
strong son preference (Clark 2000). This preference is reÀ ected in fertility behavior in the 
form of DSB. In our analysis, we concretize DSB as follows:
Assumption 1. Couples continue childbearing until they attain a desired target 
 number of sons, k, or hit a ceiling for the maximum number of children, N, with 
k  N. 
Let us denote the probability of a male birth as q, with 0 < q < 1. Table 1 gives the 
various possible completed family structures (in terms of the number of children and their 
gender) that would emerge in a population practicing DSB and the probabilities associated 
with those family structures. 
Note that DSB does not affect the sex ratio at birth (SRB), de¿ ned as male births 
per 100 female births. This fact has an important implication for countries in Asia and 
Africa that have witnessed increasing population sex ratios (males per 100 females) and 
SRBs in recent decades. Because the presence of DSB by itself does not affect the SRB, 
an increasing trend in SRBs can result from only one of the following: biological factors, 
as Oster (2005) suggested; the increasing prevalence of sex-selective abortion of female 
fetuses, as has been recently reported in the press (see, e.g., the coverage by BBC at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4592890.stm); or economic development and reductions in 
infant mortality rates, as suggested by Bhaskar and Gupta (2007). Ascertaining which of 
these alternative explanations can better explain the increasing SRB remains an important 
research question. 
The Sibling Effect 
The ¿ rst implication of DSB that we wish to highlight is that, on average, girls are born into 
larger families. We call this effect of DSB the “sibling effect,” and we offer two quantita-
tive measures of it. 
Averaging over families. The ¿ rst measure of the sibling effect is computed as the 
difference between (1) the expected number of siblings for children in families with at least 
2. When we mention birth order without any quali¿ cation in this article, we mean the relative birth order.
one male child and (2) the expected number of siblings for children in families with at least 
one female child. Because all children within a family share the same number of siblings, 
the expected number of siblings for children in families with at least one male child gives 
an estimate of the average number of siblings that boys have in the population; similarly, 
the expected number of siblings for children in families with at least one female child gives 
an estimate of the average number of siblings that girls have in the population. The differ-
ence between the two, therefore, gives an estimate of what we have called the sibling effect. 
Using Table 1, it can be seen that the expected number of siblings for families with at 
least one boy, Ms1, is
1 (1 )
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This gives us the ¿ rst measure of the sibling effect:
SE F M1 s s= <1 1. (4)
Averaging over children. The second measure of “sibling effect” is computed as 
the difference between (1) the expected number of siblings for male children, and (2) the 
expected number of siblings for female children. Averaging over children takes account 
of differences in family sizes, that is, the actual number of boys and girls in each family. 
Table 1. Family Structures and Number of Siblings
 Sibling
Total Children Boys Girls per Child Probability    
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and the expected number of siblings for a child given that it is a girl, F2s , is 
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This gives us the second measure of the sibling effect: 
SE F M2 2s s= < 2 . (7)
Observation 1. If Assumption 1 is satis¿ ed, then SE1  0,N,1  k < N. 
An algebraic proof of Observation 1 is available from the authors upon request. We 
avoided a similar algebraic result for SE2 because it seemed much more cumbersome. Nu-
merical computation, however, demonstrates that SE2 is always positive. We do not include 
these computations in the article for the sake of brevity, but they can be obtained from the 
authors upon request. 
The Birth-Order Effect 
As we noted earlier, DSB implies that couples are more likely to stop childbearing if they 
have boys, rather than girls, at early parities. One implication of this is that boys will be 
born relatively later within families. We try to capture this quantitatively using the  notion 
of an average within-family birth order (AWFBO) score: the AWFBO score for boys (girls) 
measures the relative position of boys (girls) within the birth history of the family. 
For instance, consider a family with the following birth sequence: BGBBG (where B 
refers to a boy, G refers to a girl, and time moves from left to right). Here, the ¿ rstborn 
child was a boy, the second-born was a girl, the third- and fourth-born were boys, and the 
last-born (i.e., the youngest) was a girl. For this family, the AWFBO score for boys would 
be 8/3 = (1 + 3 + 4) / 3, and the AWFBO score for girls would be 7/2 = (2 + 5) / 2. Note that 
families with no boys will not have an AWFBO score for boys, and those with no girls will 
not have an AWFBP score for girls. 
To compute the mean AWFBO scores for boys and girls in the population, we use 
Table 2 (a variant of Table 1). The ¿ rst and last columns of Table 2 are identical to the cor-
responding columns in Table 1; the second and third columns give the AWFBO scores for 
boys and girls, respectively. The ¿ rst row does not have an AWFBO score for girls because 
these families have no female children; similarly, the last row does not have an AWFBO 
score for boys because these families do not have male children.
Using Table 2, the mean relative birth order for boys is 
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Similarly, the mean relative birth order for girls is 
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Observation 2.  If Assumption 1 is satis¿ ed, then 0><BO BOBOE M F= , , N 1 k .N  
Details of how to derive the expressions for BOM  and BOF , and an algebraic proof 
of  Observation 2 for the case q = 0.5 are available from the authors upon request. We 
avoided a similar algebraic proof for a general value of q because it is more cumbersome 
and provides no additional insight. However, numerical computation demonstrated that 
0><BO BOBOE M F=  for a range of plausible values of q. 
Some limitations of our de¿ nition of the birth-order effect deserve attention; future 
work will need to re¿ ne the AWFBO score to account for such issues. For instance, con-
sider two families with the following birth sequences: BGGB and GBBG. For both fami-
lies, the AWFBO scores are same for girls. On average, however, girls might be better off 
in the second family because one of the girls in the second family is the youngest child and 
might be able to escape all household responsibilities, whereas both girls in the ¿ rst family 
might have to take care of younger sibling. Another problem of our formulation is that we 
have not explicitly taken account of birth spacing. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
We carry out the empirical analysis in two steps. In the ¿ rst step, we test for the presence 
of sibling and birth-order effects in the sample as evidence of DSB. In the second step, 
we estimate the effect of covariates on son targeting behavior, total fertility rates, and the 
interaction between the two (using household-level data on birth histories) using maximum 
likelihood estimation. 
Table 2. Family Structures and AWFBOa Scores
AWFBO Score, AWFBO Score, Sibling
Total Children Boys Girls per Child Probability    
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aTh e AWFBO score is the average within-family birth order score; for details see the text.
Sibling and Birth-Order Effects 
For empirical analysis, we use data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS; 
 formerly known as the World Fertility Survey and the Contraceptive Prevalence Survey), 
which is part of a standardized survey conducted in over 70 developing countries by USAID. 
We use the latest available survey or the one closest to the year 2000. (See Tables 3 and 4 
for details of the data set for each country.) Apart from being a comprehensive survey cover-
ing almost all relevant aspects of health and educational indicators, the DHS also provides 
detailed information on the birth history of the interviewed women (between the ages of 15 
and 49 years). The detailed birth history allows us to know the exact family structure and 
birth sequence for each of the interviewed women and thus permits us to test our hypotheses 
regarding the sibling effect and the birth-order effect.3 
Because male-preferring stopping rules entail decision-making (about having more 
children) conditional on the sex composition of existing children, we limit our calculations 
to living children within each family. Since couples try to reach a desired number of living 
sons and stop when they hit a ceiling for the maximum number of living children, looking 
at living children is more relevant than looking at all the children ever born. Additionally, 
we limit our computations to families that have completed their birth histories because the 
two effects will emerge fully only after fertility is complete. We present results for several 
countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa in Tables 3 
and 4. In these tables, we report SE1 as the measure of the sibling effect. We also present 
results for India disaggregated at the state level in Table 5. 
The results are along expected lines. Most of the countries in South Asia, Southeast 
Asia, and North Africa display signi¿ cant sibling and birth-order effects. Countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, do not display any statistically signi¿ cant sibling 
or birth-order effects. There might be several reasons for the relative absence of both the 
3. DHS data can be downloaded, with prior permission, from http://www.measuredhs.com.
Table 3. Sibling and Birth-Order Eff ects for Asia and North Africa
Survey Sample Sibling Eff ect
b Birth-Order Eff ectc _____________________ _____________________
Country Datea Size Eff ect t Statistic Eff ect t Statistic  
Asia
Bangladesh 1999–2000 10,544 0.07 2.62 0.04 2.36
India 1998–1999 90,303 0.13 14.93 0.03 4.92
Indonesia 2002–2003 29,483 0.00 0.83 0.03 2.81
Nepal 2001 8,726 0.18 6.57 0.03 1.61
Pakistan 1990–1991 6,611 0.06 1.33 –0.05 –1.46
Philippines 2003 13,633 0.03 1.15 –0.01 –0.57
Sri Lanka 1987 5,865 0.04 1.33 0.02 0.65
Th ailand 1987 6,775 0.03 0.82 0.00 0.08
North Africa
Egypt 2000 15,573 0.06 2.92 0.04 2.86
Morocco 2003 16,798 0.04 1.43 –0.02 –1.07
aData for this analysis come from the Demographic and Health Surveys.
bSibling eff ect is measured according to Eq. (4) in the text.
cFor details of how the birth-order eff ect is measured, refer to Observation 2 in the text.
effects in sub-Saharan Africa. Populations in sub-Saharan Africa might not have strong 
preference for sons. Alternatively, the absence of effects might be due to high fertility. A 
population that has both high fertility (high value of N) and a high numerical value of the 
son target (high value of k) can have small sibling and birth-order effects. This, rather than 
the absence of son preference, seems to be the case for countries in sub-Saharan Africa for 
two reasons. First, when we numerically compute the sibling and birth-order effects, we 
see that whenever N and k are close together, sibling and birth-order effects are small or 
zero. Second, commonly used measures of son preference (e.g., the ratio of desired sons to 
daughters, or the proportion of families using contraceptives after two sons compared with 
Table 4. Sibling and Birth-Order Eff ects for Sub-Saharan Africa
Survey Sample Sibling Eff ect
b Birth-Order Eff ectc _____________________  _____________________
Country Datea Size Eff ect t Statistic Eff ect t Statistic  
Benin 2001 6,219 0.03 0.44 0.00 0.04
Burkina Faso 2003 12,477 0.03 0.75 –0.02 –0.53
Burundi 1987 3,970 0.06 0.74 –0.05 –0.72
Cameroon 2004 10,656 0.01 0.09 –0.04 –0.92
CAR 1994–1995 5,884 –0.01 –0.13 –0.01 –0.23
Chad 1996–1997 7,454 –0.05 –0.70 0.06 1.18
Comoros 1996 3,050 –0.13 –1.23 0.02 0.19
Cote d’Ivoire 1998 3,040 0.08 0.76 –0.09 –1.15
Ethiopia 2000 15,367 0.01 0.28 –0.02 –0.73
Gabon 2000–2001 6,183 –0.03 –0.36 0.00 0.06
Ghana 1998–1999 4,843 0.00 –0.03 –0.08 –1.79
Guinea 1999 6,753 –0.01 –0.26 –0.01 –0.34
Kenya 2003 8,195 0.02 0.50 –0.02 –0.56
Madagascar 1997 7,060 –0.02 –0.41 0.01 0.22
Malawi 2000 13,220 –0.04 –1.13 0.02 0.88
Mali 2000 12,849 0.02 0.37 –0.03 –0.97
Mozambique 2003 12,418 –0.02 –0.56 0.02 0.73
Namibia 2000 6,755 –0.04 –0.82 0.02 0.71
Niger 1998 7,577 0.03 0.41 0.00 –0.06
Nigeria 1999 9,810 0.11 1.78 –0.08 –1.77
Rwanda 2000 10,421 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.38
South Africa 1998 11,735 0.03 0.88 –0.03 –1.45
Sudan 1989–1990 5,860 –0.02 –0.31 –0.02 –0.43
Tanzania 1999 4,029 0.03 0.38 0.01 0.13
Uganda 2000–2001 7,246 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.40
Zambia 2001 7,658 –0.01 –0.09 0.00 –0.09
Zimbabwe 1999 5,907 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.55
aData for this analysis come from the Demographic and Health Surveys.
bSibling eff ect is measured according to Eq. (4) in the text.
cFor details of how the birth-order eff ect is measured, refer to Observation 2 in the text.
those using contraceptives after two girls) show that many countries of sub-Saharan Africa 
display son preference.4 
For India, the two effects are strong for the states in the northern, central, and western 
regions; Kerala in the south and the states of the northeast generally do not show these ef-
fects. This is in accord with much evidence (anecdotal and otherwise) on the prevalence of 
patriarchal practices in different regions of the country.
4. We do not report these results in any depth here because they are not the focus of this article; details are
available from the authors upon request.
Table 5. Sibling and Birth-Order Eff ects for Indian States
Sibling Eff ecta Birth-Order Eff ectb_____________________  _____________________
State Eff ect t Statistic Eff ect t Statistic
Andhra Pradesh 0.04 1.16 0.03 4.92
Arunachal Pradesh 0.10 1.17 –0.08 –1.29
Assam 0.11 2.35 –0.04 –1.24
Bihar 0.17 5.29 –0.03 –1.39
Delhi 0.14 3.31 0.06 1.99
Goa 0.12 1.77 0.04 0.87
Gujrat 0.20 5.53 0.12 4.42
Haryana 0.28 6.74 0.07 2.37
Himachal Pradesh 0.19 5.35 0.11 4.05
Jammu and Kashmir 0.12 2.75 0.11 3.29
Karnataka 0.08 2.42 0.07 2.54
Kerala 0.02 0.54 0.01 0.19
Madhya Pradesh 0.19 6.36 0.03 1.30
Maharashtra 0.15 5.41 0.11 5.25
Manipur 0.15 2.05 0.12 2.23
Meghalaya 0.07 0.65 –0.09 –1.04
Mizoram 0.05 0.62 0.10 1.64
Nagaland 0.09 0.83 –0.06 –0.81
Orissa 0.16 4.70 0.02 0.78
Punjab 0.18 5.10 0.21 7.48
Rajashthan 0.19 6.19 0.09 3.90
Sikkim 0.18 2.35 0.00 0.09
Tamil Nadu 0.06 2.11 0.06 2.63
Tripura 0.15 2.13 0.04 0.72
Uttar Pradesh 0.18 6.59 0.01 0.53
West Bengal 0.12 3.12 0.01 0.57
aSibling eff ect is measured according to Eq. (4) in the text.
bFor details of how the birth-order eff ect is measured, refer to Observation 2 in the text.
The Empirical Model 
In the second step of the empirical analysis, we analyze the effect of covariates on son 
targeting behavior, fertility behavior, and the interaction between the two for India, a 
country that displays DSB (as seen in the previous subsection). To do so, we estimate the 
parameters of our simple model using the method of maximum likelihood with data from 
the 1992 DHS for India. 
We start by introducing some notation. Let Si denote the completed birth sequence for 
the ith family. For instance, Si could be BBG (where B stands for boy, and G indicates girl). 
Let Ni denote the maximum number of children that family i would like to have, and let 
ki denote the target number of boys for family i. Let Xi denote a vector of covariates that 
determines the probability of son targeting behavior for family i, and let Zi denote a vector 
of covariates that determines the desired maximum number of children, Ni, for family i; 
note that X and Z can contain common variables. 
This analysis concerns the population of families with completed birth histories. To 
estimate the effect of covariates on targeting and fertility behavior, we will calculate the 
joint likelihood of observing a given birth sequence (Si) and desired maximum number of 
children (Ni). In other words, we will compute P(Si,Ni), where P(.) denotes probability. To 
do so, we proceed as follows. 
We introduce Ti, a dichotomous unobservable variable that indicates whether family i 
targets sons. Ti = 0 means that the family does not target sons, and Ti = 1 implies that family 
i does target sons. Finally, we let Ti be determined by a vector of observable covariates, Xi, 
in the following manner: 
0
iT = )  if Xiβ + εi ≤ 0
1 if Xiβ + εi > 0
, (10)
where Xi is a (1 × k) vector of covariates that determine whether a particular family targets 
sons; ȕ is a (k × 1) vector of parameters to be estimated; and İi¾N(0,1) captures the unob-
servable, stochastic factors that affect son targeting behavior. 
To obtain the likelihood for the observed birth sequence and maximum number of 
children for the ith family, note that 
P(Si,Ni) = P(Si,Ni | Ti = 0)P(Ti = 0) + P(Si,Ni | Ti = 1)P(Ti = 1)
= P(Si,Ni | Ti = 0)P(Ti = 0) + P(Si,Ni | Ti = 1)P(Ti = 1)
= P(Si,Ni | Ti = 0)P(Ni | Ti = 0)P(Ti = 0) + P(Si | Ni,Ti = 1)P(Ni | Ti = 1)P(Ti = 1)
= I(n(Si) = Ni)qbi(1 – q)giP(Ni | Ti = 0)P(Ti = 0) + P(Si | Ni,Ti = 1)P(Ni | Ti = 1)
P(Ti = 1)
= I(n(Si) = Ni)qbi(1 – q)giP(Ni | Ti = 0) \(–Xiȕ) + P(Si | Ni,Ti = 1)P(Ni | Ti = 1)
[1 – \(–Xiȕ)],
where ĭ(.) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function, I(.) denotes the 
indicator function, bi is the number of boys and gi is the number of girls in the ith family, 
and n(Si) denotes the number of children in birth sequence Si; q is the probability of a male 
birth, and for the estimation, we use a value of q = 0.514, which is a widely accepted ¿ gure 
(see, e.g., Hesketh and Wei Xing 2006). 
Because of DSB, when a family does not target sons, the effective stopping rule for 
childbirth becomes the maximum number of children that the family desires to have, Ni. 
Hence, the probability of observing Si given Ni when the family does not target sons (i.e., 
P(Si | Ni,Ti = 0)) is I(n(Si) = Ni)qbi(1 – q)gi. The indicator function is meant to rule out the 
 possibility that a family that stops childbearing before reaching its desired maximum 
number of children might not target sons: in our model, any family that stops childbearing 
before hitting the ceiling, Ni, targets sons. This gives us the ¿ rst term in the joint probability 
expression above. The second term comes from families that target sons, so we need to 
compute P(Si | Ni,Ti = 1). 
When a family targets sons, its target, ki, can range anywhere from 1 to Ni – 1; targeting 
ki = Ni sons with a ceiling for the desired maximum number of children set at Ni is equiva-
lent to not targeting sons. Because we cannot observe ki (the target number of sons for a 
family), we condition on ki and then integrate it out as follows: 
| , 1 | , , 1 | , 1P S N T P S N k T P k N T
1
1
i i i i i i i i i i
k
N
i
i
= = = =
=
<^ ^ ^h h h/ , (11)
where P(Si | Ni,ki,Ti = 1) is the probability of observing Si given Ni, ki, and Ti = 1 (son 
targeting), and P(ki | Ni,Ti = 1) is the probability of targeting ki sons given that the desired 
maximum number of children is Ni. We do not observe these probabilities; in our model, we 
treat them as parameters and estimate them jointly with other parameters. The summation 
in Eq. (11) follows from an application of the law of total probability. 
Three things should be noted about Eq. (11). First, the summation runs until (Ni – 1) 
because ki = Ni is equivalent to not targeting. Second, we consider only cases in which 
Ni  2; this follows from the intuition that families with a desired maximum number of 
children below 2 cannot target sons in any meaningful sense. Third, in computing the 
conditional probabilities P(Si | Ni,ki,Ti = 1), we use information not only about the number 
of sons and the number of total children but also about the birth order of the children; de-
tails are available in the appendix. 
Using Eq. (11), therefore, the expression for the joint probability becomes 
, | –P S N I n S N q q P N T X1 1i i i i b g i i ii i `\= = < = =^ ^^ ^ ^ ^h h h h h h
– | , , | , |P S N k T k N T N TX1 1 1 1i i i i i
k
N
i i i i i
1
1
i
i
`\+ < = = =
=
<
P P^ ^ ^ ^h h h h6 @ / .
Next, we assume that Ni conditional on Ti is distributed as a Poisson random variable with 
a conditional mean given by hi. We try to capture two crucial facts with this formulation: 
(1) that Ni conditional on Ti is a count variable, and (2) that there is an interaction between 
the decision of son targeting and the desired maximum number of children (the interaction 
term appears in the expression for the conditional mean, hi). 
| !
exp
P N T Ni i t
Nih h
=
< i i^ ^h h ,
where 
exp TZi i ih a _= +^ h . (12)
In Eq. (12), Į captures the effect of son targeting on the total fertility rate, and Zi is a set 
of covariates that affects desired family size. Moreover, because Ti is a dichotomous vari-
able, we have 
| !
exp exp exp
P N T N
Z Z
0i i
i
i i
Nia a
= =
<^ ^^ ^h hh h6 @ , (13)
and
| !
exp exp exp
P N T N
Z Z
1i i
i
i i
Nia _ a _
= =
< + +^ ^^ ^h hh h6 @ . (14)
Using Eqs. (13), (14), and (11), we can write the expression for the joint probability 
as follows: 
`, !
exp exp exp
P S N I n S N q q N
Z Z
X1i i i i b g
i
i i
N
i
i i
ia a
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. (15)
The log-likelihood for the observed sample, then, becomes 
,log logl L P S N
1
I i
i
n
= =
=
^ ^^h hh/ ,
where n is the number of families in the sample, and P(Si,Ni) is substituted from Eq. 
(15). Maximizing l will give the estimates of the parameters of interest in the model: Į 
( interaction term), ȕ (targeting behavior), Ȗ (determinants of family size), and the prob-
abilities P(ki | Ni,Ti = 1). The following interpretations naturally emerge for the parameters 
in our model: Į captures the effect of son targeting on the total fertility rate; ȕ captures 
the effect of covariates on the probability of targeting sons; Ȗ provides the effect of co-
variates on the maximum number of children (the total fertility rate) desired by families; 
and P(ki | Ni,Ti = 1) is the probability of targeting ki sons given that the family desires a 
maximum of Ni children. 
An alternative method of empirical analysis might proceed by estimating a model of 
parity-progression rates, as in Gray and Evans (2005), for instance. We choose to follow 
our method for two reasons. First, our empirical method ¿ ts the theoretical part of our argu-
ment much more closely and follows from it naturally. Second, our theoretical and empiri-
cal analysis allows us to draw out some implications of son targeting behavior that might 
have important effects on gender inequality that we wish to explore in the future. A model 
of parity-progression rates would allow us to detect the presence of son targeting behavior 
without highlighting the sibling and birth-order effects. 
Results for India 
Covariates and the estimates for India are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Signs on most 
 variables in Table 6 are along expected lines. Let us ¿ rst look at the targeting equation (Eq. 
(10)). The covariates that do not seem to affect the probability of targeting are years of 
formal education, whether the respondent lives in an extended family, and middle  income. 
The estimates also indicate that age of the mother has a negative impact on the prob-
ability of son targeting. In addition, families in rural areas are more likely than those in 
urban areas to target sons through male-preferring stopping behavior. Thus, geographic 
location seems to matter for gender inequality. Respondents’ participation in the labor force 
positively affects the probability of targeting; this is rather surprising and runs counter to 
earlier suggestions (see, e.g., Sen 1990). Income dummy variables show that compared with 
wealthy families, low- and middle-income families have a higher probability of son target-
ing, which is more or less in agreement with anecdotal evidence. The use of contraceptives 
signi¿ cantly increases the probability of targeting; this is to be expected because without 
contraceptives, it would be dif¿ cult to enforce differential stopping behavior (or any other 
kind of stopping behavior). Our results suggest that Hindu families are more likely to target 
sons than are non-Hindu families. Based on anecdotal evidence on Hinduism suggesting 
that a religious sanction is behind son preference, this ¿ nding is not surprising. 
Turning to the equation for the determination of family size (Eq. (12)), all the variables 
in Table 6 signi¿ cantly affect the dependent variable except the dummy variables for work 
and extended family. Along expected lines, age of the mother is associated with increases in 
the average family size, and years of formal education is associated with reductions in the 
average family size; rural families have larger families. The income dummy variables show 
expected results: compared with wealthy households, both middle-income and low-income 
households have larger average family sizes, and the effect is stronger for lower-income 
families. Turning to the religion dummy variable, Hindu families have larger family sizes 
than non-Hindu families. 
Along expected lines, the interaction term is positive and highly signi¿ cant; families 
that are more likely to target sons tend to have larger families. This is to be expected be-
cause son preference will induce couples to continue childbearing in their attempt to attain 
the targeted number of boys. The targeting probabilities in Table 7 reveal a simple pattern: 
conditional on targeting, couples are more likely to target a higher than lower number of 
sons. For instance, families that set a ceiling at ¿ ve children are more likely to target four 
boys than three, three boys more than two, and two boys more than one. 
One possible criticism of the results of this empirical analysis might be the following: 
we treated the probability of male birth as exogenous in our model, but in reality, it might 
be affected by human intervention in the form of sex-selective abortion and thus may be 
endogenous. Although this concern is valid in general, we think that our empirical  analysis 
Table 6. Estimation Resultsa for India, 1992
Variable Coeffi  cient SE
Average Family Size 
Age of the mother 0.019 0.0003
Education –0.007 0.0005
Work –0.007 –0.005
Rural 0.065 –0.006
Low income 0.546 –0.013
Middle income 0.042 –0.012
Hindu 0.159 –0.009
Extended family 0.002 –0.008
Interaction Term 
Intercept 0.042 –0.008
Son Targeting 
Intercept –1.18 –0.094
Age of the mother –0.005 –0.001
Education 0.0008 –0.002
Work 0.047 –0.022
Contraception use 0.562 –0.023
Rural 0.08 –0.026
Extended family 0.017 –0.031
Hindu 0.081 –0.039
Low income 0.235 –0.079
Middle income 0.066 –0.077
aFor a defi nition of the model, refer to Eq. (15). 
is not affected by this problem. The reason is that ultrasound technology for the sex de-
termination of the fetus became available only from the late-1980s onward in India and 
could not have affected most of the births recorded in the DHS 1992 (the data set that we 
used for our ML estimation); the effects of sex-selective abortion can be detected only in 
surveys from a later period. Hence, the problem of endogeneity of the probability of male 
birth should not be a serious problem for the empirical results in this article. 
CONCLUSION 
In developing economies, son preference has often been expressed through son targeting 
fertility behavior. In this article, we drew out two demographic implications of son targeting 
fertility behavior: (1) on average, girls will be born into larger families, and (2) on average, 
girls will be born at relatively earlier parities within families. These two implications of son 
targeting fertility behavior might be useful for explaining the generation and perpetuation 
of gender inequality even in the absence of intrahousehold biases in resource allocation 
against daughters. The fact that girls are born into larger families means that they have 
to share resources with many siblings; this might put them at a disadvantage even when 
parents do not discriminate against girls. The fact that girls are born at relatively earlier 
parities might also work to their disadvantage. In poorer and larger families in which both 
parents work to make ends meet, part of the parental responsibility for younger children is 
passed on to older children in the family. Because most of the older children are girls, this 
responsibility will be disproportionately borne by them. Being burdened with sundry house-
work and the responsibilities associated with caring for younger children, these girls might 
not be able to devote their full time and energy to their own education or other recreational 
activities. We wish to explore these possibilities in our future research. 
Our empirical analysis shows that both the implications of son targeting fertility 
 behavior are present in several countries in Asia and North Africa, though they are absent 
in sub-Saharan countries. This might be evidence for the existence and strengthening 
of son preference in the former group of countries. When we turn our attention to the 
Table 7. Estimated Targeting Probabilitiesa
Targeting Probability Estimate
P(k = 1|N = 3, T = 1) .273
P(k = 2|N = 3, T = 1) .726
P(k = 1|N = 4, T = 1) .204
P(k = 2|N = 4, T = 1) .399
P(k = 3|N = 4, T = 1) .398
P(k = 1|N = 5, T = 1) .054
P(k = 2|N = 5, T = 1) .205
P(k = 3|N = 5, T = 1) .315
P(k = 4|N = 5, T = 1) .426
P(k = 1|N = 6, T = 1) .058
P(k = 2|N = 6, T = 1) .177
P(k = 3|N = 6, T = 1) .204
P(k = 4|N = 6, T = 1) .261
P(k = 5|N = 6, T = 1) .300
aFor a defi nition of these probabilities, refer to the 
 appendix. All probabilities reported here are statistically 
signifi cant at the 5% level.
 determinants of targeting behavior, we ¿ nd that geographic location and income strongly 
affect son targeting. We also ¿ nd that families that target sons are also more likely to have 
larger families. 
APPENDIX 
In this appendix, we sketch the method that we have used to compute the conditional prob-
abilities, P(Si | Ni,ki,Ti = 1), that have been used in the maximum likelihood estimation;5 for 
illustration, we work with a probability of male birth of (1/2) here. The logic of our method 
is straightforward. For every family, we are given a completed birth sequence (Si) and the 
desired maximum number of children (Ni). For such a family, we must compute the follow-
ing (Ni – 1) conditional probabilities: P(Si | Ni = 4, ki = 1, Ti = 1), P(Si | Ni = 4, ki = 2, Ti = 1), 
and P(Si | Ni = 4, ki = 3, Ti = 1). We need to compute all these probabilities because we do 
not observe the desired target for sons.
Because, a priori, we do not know the desired target (for sons) for family i, we need 
to allow for all feasible possibilities. Thus, when a family states that the maximum number 
of children that it desires is Ni, we need to allow for the possibilities that the family targets 
1 son, 2 sons, …, Ni – 1 sons. Of course, the actual birth sequence might assign zero prob-
ability to some of these possibilities, but we cannot rule any of these out a priori. 
To compute something like P(Si | Ni,ki,Ti = 1), we merely need to observe whether the 
family has any child after the kith son. If there is a child after the kith son, we assign zero 
probability to P(Si | Ni,ki,Ti = 1); otherwise we assign it a probability of (1/2)n, where n is 
the number of children in the sequence Si. 
An example might clarify matters. Suppose a family reports that the maximum number 
of children it desires to have is 4 and the birth sequence (starting with the ¿ rst-born child) 
for the family is observed to be GGBG (where G stands for a girl, and B stands for a boy). 
For such a family, we need to compute the following probabilities: P(GGBG | Ni = 4, ki = 1, 
Ti = 1), P(GGBG | Ni = 4, ki = 2, Ti = 1), and P(GGBG | Ni = 4, ki = 3, Ti = 1). Because there 
is a child after the ¿ rst boy, this family could not possibly be targeting one son; hence, 
P(GGBG | Ni = 4, ki = 1, Ti = 1) = 0. But the family could conceivably be targeting two or 
even three sons; these possibilities are not ruled out by the observed birth sequence. Hence, 
P(GGBG | Ni = 4, ki = 2, Ti = 1) = (1 / 16); similarly, P(GGBG | Ni = 4, ki = 3, Ti = 1) = (1 / 16). 
To clarify matters further, take another example. Suppose the family in question 
 reports a maximum desired family size (number of children) of 4 and we observe the 
completed birth sequence for the same family to be BGB. Because there is a child after the 
¿ rst boy, this family could not possibly be targeting one son; hence, P(BGB | Ni = 4, ki = 1, 
Ti = 1) = 0. Because there is no child after the second boy, the family could possibly be 
targeting 2 sons; hence, P(BGB | Ni = 4, ki = 2, Ti = 1) = (1 / 8). And because the family stops 
at three children (with two sons), it cannot be targeting three sons. Hence, P(BGB | Ni = 4, 
ki = 3, Ti = 1) = 0. 
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